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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN CUNNINGHAM and DEN-
NIS PARKER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12253 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence of 
an unlawful sale of an hallucinogenic drug in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were tried on a charge of the unlawful 
sale of LSD, contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6(a) 
(1953), before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, sitting 
without a jury. Upon a verdict of guilty appellants were 
sentenced on July 20, 1970, to a term of imprisonment 
at the Utah State Prison; and are appealing from the 
judgment and sentence. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the findings of the lower 
court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In late November of 1969, agent Loni DeLand, doing 
undercover work for the Utah Liquor Law Enforcement 
Division, and Kathy Olson, his assistant, made the ac-
quaintance of one Mike Fellows. They bought some LSD 
tablets from Fellows and had requested more, hoping 
that Fellows could lead them to the source of his supply. 
Fellows, on November 30, 1969, took DeLand and Olson 
to the appellants' apartment located at 329 East Seventh 
South, Salt Lake City. There DeLand and Olson met 
appellant Parker (R. 29-31). 
While DeLand and another police officer stayed 
downstairs, Olson, Fellows and Parker went upstairs. 
Kathy Olson was introduced to Cunningham by Fellows. 
Olson then inquired as to whether or not she could get a 
quantity of LSD tablets from appellants. Cunningham 
told her that the price for the tablets would be $2.50 per 
tablet or "hit." Cunningham stated that he had some 
LSD tablets but that if Olson would wait until the 3rd 
of December he could then tell her how much he could 
supply. She gave Cunningham her telephone number and 
he said that he would call on December 3rd (R. 61-62). 
DeLand and Olson went to the appellants' apartment 
on the 3rd of December, 1969. They were invited in by 
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Parker, went upstairs, and were seated in the living room. 
A few minutes later Cunningham entered the room. 
Cunningham then asked Olson and DeLand if they still 
planned to buy a large quantity of LSD on the 5th of 
December. They replied that they did but stated that 
they only wanted eight tablets or "hits" at that time. 
Miss Olson aslrnd Cunningham the price and he replied 
"$2.50 per hit." Appellant Parker then removed eight 
orange tablets from a small glass vial containing 20 to 25 
orange tablets and gave them to DeLand. DeLand then 
gave the two a $20 bill (R. 31-35). 
Cunningham and Parker were subsequently arrested 
on December 5, 1969, and charged with an unlawful sale 
of hallucinogenic drugs (R. 95-96) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS' DE FENS E OF ENTRAP-
MENT IS NOT SUFFICIENT LEGALLY OR 
FACTUALLY TO REVERSE THEIR CON-
VICTIONS. 
The first Supreme Court decision to deal with the 
defense of entrapment was Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U. S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413 (1932). The case 
concerned a federal agent who asked the defendant to 
procure some liquor for him. After several requests by 
the agent and after the agent told the defendant that he 
was in the same army unit as the defendant the agent 
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received the liquor. As the court stated at 287 U. S. at 
441: 
"It is clear that the evidence was sufficient 
to warrant a finding that the act for which defen-
dant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohi-
bition agent, that it was the creature of his pur-
pose, that defendant had no previous disposition 
to commit it but was an industrious law-abiding 
citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, other-
wise innocent, to its commission by repeated and 
persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by 
taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by 
reminiscences of their experiences as companions 
in arms in the World War." 
The court went on to hold that the defense of en-
trapment should have been available to defendant at 
trial. In so holding the court also provided a rule by 
which to gauge evidence of entrapment. At page 451, 216, 
the court said: 
"The predisposition and criminal design of the 
defendant are relevant. But the issues raised must 
be pertinent to the controlling question whether 
the defendant is a person otherwise innocent 
whom the government is seeking to punish for an 
alleged offense which is the product of the creative 
activity of its own officials." 
In Utah the standard for entrapment is set out in 
the opinion of State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P. 
2d 494 (1962). As stated by Justice Crockett: 
"For a peace officer to procure a person to 
commit a crime which he otherwise would not 
have committed,' for the purpose of apprehending 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
~d prosecuting him is entrapment. This is so 
discordant to the true function of law enforcement 
which is the prevention, not the accusation of cr~e; .and so repugnant to fundamental conc~pts 
of Justice that the conviction of an accused under 
such circumstances will not be approved. When 
that issue is present the question is whether the 
crime is the product of defendant's own intention 
and desire, or is the product of some incitement 
or inducement by the peace officer. If the crime 
was in fact so instigated or induced by what the 
officer did that the latter's conduct was the gen-
erating cause which produced the crime, and with-
out which it would not have been committed, the 
defendant should not be convicted. On the other 
hand if defendant's attitude of mind was such 
that he desired and intended to commit the crime, 
the mere fact that an officer or someone else 
afforded him the opportunity to commit it would 
not constitute entrapment which would be a de-
fense to its commission; and this would not be 
less true even though an undercover man went 
along with the defendant in the criminal plan and 
aided or encouraged him in it." 
Respondent contends that neither under the holding 
of Sorrells or Pacheco can appellants show that they were 
entrapped. Their arrest and subsequent conviction was 
because they desired and intended to commit the crime. 
The state agents involved in the case only afforded de-
fendants an opportunity to commit the crime. 
The defense of entrapment has been held to be a 
defense as a matter of law in some instances. In the case 
of Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1958), the court held that the evidence 
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showed entrapment as a matter of law. The defendant 
there was a narcotics addict who was being medically 
treated for his addiction. The defendant happened to 
make the acquaintance of another addict also being 
treated by the same doctor. The other addict was also 
a government informer. They requested Sherman to sup-
ply him with drugs, a request which Sherman declined. 
Sherman finally relented after several requests and sev-
eral appeals to his sympathies by the government in-
former. Thereafter he supplied the informer with drugs 
on ~everal occasions. The informer's solicitation not only 
enticed Sherman into selling drugs but also got him to 
return to his old drug habit. The Court felt that the in-
former's actions were so blatantly contrary to public pol-
icy and so obviously evil that the Court found entrap-
ment as a matter of law. 
The facts in the case at hand do not point to en-
trapment per se. At the first meeting on November 29, 
1969, Kathy Olson inquired as to how much LSD they 
could get. She was told by Cunningham that he would 
know on the 3rd of December, 1969, how much he could 
supply to her and that he had some LSD tablets then 
but they were promised to someone else (R. 61-62). At 
the second meeting of the appellants and DeLand and 
Olson, Cunningham asked if they still wanted a large 
quantity of LSD. Olson and DeLand replied that they 
did but at that time they only wanted eight tablets of 
LSD, with which they were supplied (R. 31-35). The 
evidence does not show entrapment as a matter of law 
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as in Sherman. The evidence does show a request made 
by Olson and DeLand that was readily complied with 
by appellants. 
The appellants raised the defense of entrapment at 
the trial court. Once the defendants bring into issue the 
defense of entrapment the state's evidence must be suffi-
cient to rebut it. In the Utah case of State v. Perkins, 
19 Utah 2d 421, 432 P. 2d 50 (1967), the defense attorney 
brought into issue entrapment. In order to overcome that 
defense the state showed evidence of prior contacts be-
tween the state's agent and the defendant. The evidence 
showed prior solicitations and drug sales by the defen-
dant. This evidence was used in order to show an intent 
or a predisposition to commit the criminal act. Such evi-
dence shows that a defendant is not an innocent, law-
abiding citizen who was coaxed by government agents to 
do a criminal act, but was in reality a person who was 
ready and willing to commit a criminal act. In the case 
of State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 236, 495 P. 2d 1265 (1972), 
the prosecution again used evidence of prior drug sales 
to show that the defendant had a prior inclination to 
commit the crime of selling marijuana. 
In the instant case there is no evidence of prior drug 
sales, prior convictions for drug sales, or prior contacts 
with state agents. The exact issue that is present here 
has not been raised in the courts of Utah. The issue is 
:oimply one of showing intent or predisposition to commit 
aa criminal act absent any prior evidence of criminal ac-
tivity. That issue was also presented in United States v. 
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Rodrigues, 433 F. 2d 760 (1st Cir. 1970). There the de-
fendant was convicted of selling heroin to a government 
agent. The defendant pled entrapment as a defense to 
the charge. The court's approach to the problem of en-
trapment was not the traditional bifurcation of the de-
fense into the sub-issues of inducement and predisposi-
tion. They used an analysis developed in an earlier case, 
Kadis v. United States, 373 F. 2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967). 
With that approach the court examines " 'ultimate ques-
tions of entrapment.' " The defendant first goes forward 
with the defense by showing some evidence that it was 
not his intent or predisposition to commit the crime 
charged. The government must then prove defendant 
was not induced to commit the criminal act by its agents. 
In Rodrigues, there was no evidence of prior connection 
with the narcotics trade to rebut the entrapment defense. 
The court, however, held that there were other means 
to rebut this defense. The court states at page 762 of the 
oprmon: 
"A jury can find predisposition beyond a 
reasonable doubt by looking to the totality of 
circumstances involved in the particular transac-
tions in question. Otherwise, a first offender, dis-
posed to commit the crime for which he is charged, 
would find sanctuary in the entrapment defense 
merely because the government would be unable 
to prove prior nonexistent activities. The entrap-
ment defense does not require such a result." 
By examining the totality of conduct of the appel-
lants it is clear that their entrapment defense breaks 
down. The appellants had other quantities of LSD tab-
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lets promised to other buyers. The state agents involved 
made oaly two contacts with the appellants. From the 
testimony given, the appellants were unwary and readily 
sold the illicit drugs to the agents after only two short 
encounters. Cunningham and Parker claim they were 
afraid of the agents and that is why they sold them the 
LSD (R. 84 and 98). A girl who was at the apartment 
on December 3, 1969, Sally Neilson, testified that al-
though the agents were strangers they did not make 
threats or use any threatening language while there (R. 
94) . If appellants were truly fearful they could have 
asked the agents to leave or put their requests off until 
a later date. However, they did not do this, they readily 
sold the agents the LSD tablets and readily accepted the 
$20 as payment (R. 34-35, 84). 
Appellants' testimony that they were afraid of the 
agents is unworthy of belief. There is absolutely no af-
firmative evidence that the state agents did anything to 
ma!rn appellants fearful. 
In conclusion it is respondent's contention that the 
entrapment defense was rebutted by the state's evidence. 
Appellants readily sold the LSD tablets to the two state 
agents. Thus, the test of Pacheco, to show an intention 
or predisposition to commit criminal acts is satisfied Re-
spondents urge the court to adopt the position of the 
court in the Rodrigues case. By looking at the totality 
of conduct and the ready compliance with the requests 
for the illicit drug, it is clear that the appellants were not 
innocent citizens entrapped by the state, but were crim-
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inals engaging in the proscribed act of selling drugs, not 
only to the two state agents, but others. Appellants can-
not hid behind the entrapment defense merely because 
there is no evidence of prior drug sales. The conviction 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS WERE PROPERLY C 0 N -
VI CT ED AND SENTENCED FOR THE 
CRIME OF SALE OF AN HALLUCINO-
GENIC DRUG. 
Appellants claim that they were convicted and sen-
tenced under one statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1), 
that made the crime of sale of LSD a felony, while there 
was a similar statute, Utah Code Ann. §58-17-14.11, that 
makes the same conduct a misdemeanor. It is true that 
both of these statutes do exist, or did at the time appel-
lants were convicted; however, the two statutes have 
totally different applications. Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-
14.11 is a statute that applies to the regulations of phar-
macists and the pharmacy profession. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-33-6 (1) is a statute designed to curb the abuse and 
distribution of dangerous drugs and narcotics. The real 
question that is raised by appellants' argument is show-
ing the application and construction of the two statutes 
involved. It is respondent's contention that by a logical 
reading of the statutes involved it is readily apparent 
that appellants were properly convicted and sentenced 
for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1). 
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Appellants were charged with a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1). That statute states: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to manu-
facture, compound, process, possess have under 
his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, 
use or compound any depressant, stimulant, or 
hallucinogenic, or other drug, as defined herein, 
except this prohibition shall not apply to the fol-
lowing persons whose activities in connection with 
any such drug are as specified in this subsection. 
" 
The act then exempts manufacturers operating in 
conformance with state laws, pharmacies, physicians, lab-
oratories, wholesale druggists, hospitals, and generally all 
those people who are licensed by the state and who are 
engaged in the legitimate sale, manufacture, prescribing 
and use of drugs. The penalty for violation of the above-
quoted statute is found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4 (3), 
which states: 
"Every person who transports, imports into 
this state, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, 
or attempts to import into this state or transport 
any 'depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug,' 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison from five years to life and shall not be 
eligible for release upon completion of sentence 
or on parole or on any other basis until he has 
served not less than three years." 
The statute regulating the profession of pharmacy 
and of pharmacists, Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-14.11 reads 
as follows: 
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"Any proprietor of a pharmacy or other per-
son who shall sell, dispose of, or permit the sale or 
other di~position of any drug intended for use by 
man which under the laws of this state or the laws 
of the United States, or lawful regulations there-
under, has been designated habit forming, unsafe 
for use except under the supervision of a practi-
tioner licensed to administer such drugs, or other-
wise limited to use under professional supervision 
of a practitioner licensed by law to prescribe, un-
less it is dispensed upon a prescription of a prac-
titioner licensed by law to administer the same, 
shall be guilty of an offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-26 provides that for violation 
of the above-quoted statute a person shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor. 
Appellants cite two cases attempting to uphold their 
argument that the lesser penalty should apply. The first 
case cited is State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 
146 (1969). There the defendant was charged and con-
victed of possession of LSD, a misdemeanor under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-33-4 ( 1) , but a felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-13a-44. The court held that since the prohibited 
conduct under both statutes was the same the lesser pen-
alty provided in Section 58-33-4 (1) would apply. Shondel 
can be distinguished from the instant case in that in 
Shondel, two different laws violating illicit drug sales did 
apply. Here one statute deals with illicit drug sales and 
another deals with unlawful sales over the counter at 
pharmacies or by pharmacists. 
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Appellant cites State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P. 
2d 168 ( 1969) , for the proposition that when two differ-
ent statutes apply the one providing the lesser penalty 
should govern. In Fair, the defendant was charged with 
uttering a forged prescription, a felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-13a-39 but only a misdemeanor under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-17-14.13. The court rightly held that the 
misdemeanor penalty should apply. Uttering a forged 
prescription should properly be considered under a stat-
u te relating to regulation of pharmacies and pharmacists. 
Fair can be distinguished from the instant case in that 
in Fair there was a true conflict between statutes pre-
scribing differing penalties for the same conduct. In the 
instant case the two statutes relate to differing conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-14.11 deals with dispensing of 
drugs or medicines by pharmacists or those in the phar-
macy business. Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 ( 1) deals with 
the illegal dispensing of dangerous drugs by those other 
than licensed pharmacists or qualified medical people. 
The real problem here, as stated previously, is in-
terpreting and applying the two statutes in question in 
a consistent logical manner. A guide to statutory inter-
pretation is provided for us in the case of Johnson v. 
State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P. 2d 831 
(1966). In that case the issue was the interpretation and 
implication of state tax laws. The court states: 
"The fundamental consideration which tran-
scends all others in regard to the interpretation 
and application of a statute is: What was the 
intent of the legislature? All other rules of statu-
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tory construction are subordinate to it and are 
helpful ?nl~ insofar as they assist in attaining 
that objective. In determining that intent the 
statute should be considered in the light of the 
purpose it was designed to serve and so applied 
as to carry out that purpose if that can be done 
consistent with its language." 
The same proposition, that is carrying out the intent 
of the legislature, is cited in Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 
2d 108, 433 P. 2d 846 (1967), and in State v. Salt Lake 
City Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P. 
2d 468 (1962). 
Appellants' application of Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-
14.11 is \Vithout merit. The statute applies only to "any 
proprietor of a pharmacy or other person." The well es-
tablished rule of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, 
requires that where general words or terms follow specific 
ones, the general must be understood as applying to 
things of the same kind as specified. W. S. Hatch Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P. 2d 809 
(1954). Therefore, an "other person' must be interpreted 
as someone associated with a pharmacy as an agent, em-
ployee, owner, etc. acting in connection with the phar-
macy. Furthermore, the general common-sense rule of 
statutory construction stated in Johnson v. State Tax 
Commission, supra, supports this rule. In applying that 
rule it is clear that § 58-17 -14.11 was designed to deal only 
with pharmacies and pharmacists. Section 58-33-6 ex-
empts pharmacists and others licensed to prescribe drugs 
from its provisions. Section 58-17-14.11 applies only to 
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pharrne.cies and the pharmacy profession because of their 
cxpE:::it exemption in Section 58-17-14.11. The intent of 
the legislature was to regulate two areas. One, they 
vvished to regulate the pharmacy profession. Two, they 
w:,:lied to regulate illegal drug traffic. The two statutes 
were designed to regulate two types of conduct by two 
different classes of people. This is consistent with the 
holding in Fair where a forged prescription was a crime 
under the pharmacy statute, a statute logically designed 
to deal with such things. 
Appellants made much of the language of § 58-17-
14.11 that the statute is intended to cover drugs "in-
tended for use by man." The point of the statute is not 
that it regulates drugs intended for man's use but that 
it regulates drugs that are dispensed by pharmacists. 
Heroin too is a drug that is used by man. However, it 
has no real medical use nor is it dispensed by phanna-
cistso Likewise LSD has very limited, if any, medical use 
and is not dispensed by pharmacies. Therefore, the 
prnper statute for regulating traffic in illicit drugs such 
as LSD is Section 58-33-6 (1). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4 (3) the proper sen-
tence for selling LSD is five years to life in the state 
prison. Appellants contend that Utah Code Ann. § 58-
33-4(6), which makes violation of all other provisions of 
Chapter 33, except those in Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-1 (1) 
- 58-33-1 ( 4) a felony punishable by a maximum five 
year sentence, applies in this case. Their argument is 
that since they were charged with a violation of Section 
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58-33-6 ( 1) and this is an "other" provision of Chapter 33 
then the sentence should be no more than five years. This 
argument lacks substance. Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1) 
proscribes the selling or furnishing of a hallucinogen. 
Therefore, since Section 58-33-1 ( 3) is one of the four 
paragraphs mentioned by Section 58-33-4 ( 6) , Section 58-
33-4 (6) does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants were convicted under a valid Utah stat-
ute. The sentence imposed was a proper one in the case, 
a sentence of from five years to life for the sale of LSD. 
Appellants readily sold the illegal drug to two state 
agents when it was requested by them. The conviction 
and sentence is proper and should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
WILLIAM T. EV ANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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